

14A-7

1. We shall discuss, in the first place, the aesthetic problem involved in "Antinous" or, rather, in the denunciation of "Antinous" as immoral. It is said of "Antinous" - as it has been said, from this standpoint, of all artistic works denounced as immoral, and as artistically spoilt by their immorality - that it is a bad poem because it is an immoral poem, or, better, than in so far as it is an immoral it is a bad (i.e. a worthless) poem.

As pointed out in our prefatory considerations, we shall though at disadvantage to ourselves, simplify the discussion of this point by assuming, with the accusers, that "Antinous" is immoral, though we do not admit that and shall prove that there is good reason for our not admitting it. But here we say "let us suppose that it is immoral". The consequence is that "Antinous" immediately disappears from the scene and we are brought face to face with the generic problem of the relations between art and morality, and the discussion of whether the immorality of a ~~work~~ [poem] affects its aesthetic value. For, since we have decided, in discussing this point, to concede (however unrightly /wrongly) that "Antinous" is immoral; if it be proved that the immorality of a poem in no way affects its aesthetic value, "Antinous", ~~even~~ even if supposed immoral, will escape censure in this respect.

If we have said, in the above paragraph, "any poem" and not "any work of art" it is because the trend of the coming argument will be to establish a distinction between several forms of art, between statues and poems say, in respect to moral values, what is true of the rules to be applied to a poem will be true of the rules to be applied to "Antinous", for "Antinous" is a poem; {...}

above a note: let moral part of art, but statue & poem, in respect to moral values, the trend of the coming argument will be to

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2. Any product of social human activity, be it a statue, a bridge or an election, is susceptible of being discussed under 3 heads - one being the laws of the particular technics, the art or the science, to which it, a its, belongs; the other, the laws of the type of mind which produces it; the third, the social conditions in which, both while or of which it is produced. Thus a statue can, first, be considered from the standpoint of Artistic; a bridge from the standpoint of Engineering; & an election from the standpoint of "practical" politics. A statue, a bridge, & an election, can be considered psychologically - that is to say, by an analysis of the type of mind which conceived the statue or built the bridge or [*directed] the nation. Lastly, either of the 3 products chosen for examples can be considered from a sociological standpoint.


Our case is with a poem, or, rather, with poems in general. ~~Its technical analysis falls under the head of aesthetics.~~ Our case is to analyse the scientific relations between art and morality in poetry. We have then three successive inquiries to conduct: the aesthetic one, which is, Whether the immorality of a poem, objectively considered, in any way affects the beauty of a poem, objectively considered?; the psychologic one, which is, Whether the corruption of the moral faculties of the artist does not involve a parallel, co-affected, or corruption of his artistic faculties?; and the sociologic one, which is, Whether the inadaptation to social environment presumptively involved in the writing of an immoral poem does - and how far does it if it do - imply or cause an artistic deficiency in the poet?

Yet, all the time, one essential point should not be lost sight of: while we are discussing this problem under the heads of aesthetics, psychology and sociology, these are subdivisions of the problem, they are subordinated to a general aesthetic

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
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analysis. The ~~purely~~ ^{purely} ~~psychologic~~, the ~~purely~~ ^{purely} ~~sociopsychologic~~ discussions of the problem, will come later, in the second and third sections of this book. So, keeping in mind the fact that our ~~primary~~ ^{primary} investigation is ~~now~~ at this moment primarily aesthetic and only subordinately ^{/(secondarily)\} psychological and sociologic, we are at once enabled to simplify a great part of the question.

For, leaving the aesthetic subdivision intact, for it is directly descended from the primary division itself, let us inquire into the questions put as constituting the psychological and the sociological problem, from the aesthetic standpoint.

When, as the ^{aesthetic} ~~psychologic~~ question to be analysed, we say that it is, whether the immorality of ~~the~~ an author affects subjectively his artistic faculties, we obviously do not refer to works of his into which that immorality does not pass, in which it is not expressed. That would be a purely psychologic, a purely moral, ^{in no detail} ~~nowise~~ an aesthetic problem. The relations between the arrant scoundrelism of Sallust and the beauty or perfection of his histories, in which that scoundrelism is not expressed, constitute a problem purely moral, purely psychologic. For it to become an aesthetic, though still a psychologic, problem, ~~we have put it in another way~~ the immorality must be objective, that is, must be in the book itself, not the immorality of the author as ~~an~~ man, but of the author as man. So the



question becomes: ~~To what extent if any~~ Do the faculties involved in writing an immoral poem, ~~quã immoral,~~ affect those involved in writing a poem, ~~quã poem,~~ if so, ~~to~~ in what or to what extent? ~~Now, whether we~~ hold that art and morals are related, or that they are not related, the result, in this case, is the same. If we hold that they are related and that art should be moral (no one holds that they are related to one another or not should be moral), the artist ^{/poet\} who is writing an immoral poem {...}

Now the poet who writes the poem is either himself immoral, has the vice or immorality which he has expressed in the poem; or he is not, and has not that vice or immorality. In the first case, we ~~are brought~~ again into the question of Sallust must ask whether he considers that vice as a good or an evil thing. If he considers it a good thing, not a vice at all, we are again at the case of Sallust; for {...}

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